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BARGAINING - The Supreme Court of the United States held that
the FSLMRS permits union-initiated midterm bargaining, and that
Congress delegated the agency charged with the administration of
the FSLMRS the power to determine whether the statute requires
federal agencies to negotiate union-initiated midterm contract
proposals.
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1309 v.
Department of the Interior, 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999).
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute'
("FSLMRS") requires federal agencies and the unions representing
the employees of the agencies to meet in good faith to negotiate a
collective bargaining agreement.2 Congress created the Federal
Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA") to administer the FSLMRS.3 The
National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1309 ("Union")
engaged in end-term contract negotiations with the Department of
Interior, United States Geological Survey. ("Agency"). 4 The Union
1. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994)).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1994) (stating that a federal agency must meet with the
employees' collective bargaining representative and negotiate in good faith for the purposes
of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement). A collective bargaining agreement is an
"[a]greement between an employer and a labor union which regulates terms and conditions
of employment." BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY 263 (6th ed. 1990).
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7104-7105 (1994). The FLRA is a three member body appointed by the
President and confirmed by Congress for a five year term, and it is responsible for
administering the statute through policy making, rule making, and adjudication. Id. The
Federal Service Impasse Panel ("Impasse Panel") is within the FLRA and is the body that
resolves negotiation impasses between federal employers and employee unions. 5 U.S.C. §
7119(c)(1) (1994). The Impasse Panel was created because federal employees may not strike.
5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7) (1994).
4. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Department of the Interior, 119 S.
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proposed a clause in the new contract that would require the
Agency to negotiate midterm about matters that arise during, but
are not covered by, the new contract.5 The Agency refused to
negotiate the Union proposal because it believed that the FSLMRS
prohibited the Union proposal.6
Based on the Agency refusal to negotiate the Union proposal, the
Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA against
the Agency. 7 The FLRA held that the Agency committed an unfair
labor practice against the Union by refusing to negotiate the
Union's proposal of a clause requiring midterm bargaining. 8 Further,
adopting a decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the FLRA held that the FSLMRS imposed a duty
on federal agencies to bargain midterm over union-initiated
proposals.9 To remedy the Agency's unfair labor practice, the FLRA
ordered the Agency to negotiate the Union proposal with the Union
in good faith. 10 The Agency petitioned for review in the Fourth
Circuit, and the FLRA, along with Local 1309, cross-petitioned for
Ct. 1003, 1007 (1999).
5. Id. at 1005. A midterm negotiation is one that occurs "while the basic
comprehensive labor contract is in effect." Id. The proposal read, "The Union may request
and the Employer will be obligated to negotiate on any negotiable matters not covered by
the provisions of this agreement." Id. An end-term negotiation is one that occurs after the
"basic comprehensive labor contract" expires. Id at 1005.
6. Id. The Agency relied on SSA v. FLRA, 956 F2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the FSLMRS did not require federal agencies to bargain midterm over union-initiated
proposals). Id.
7. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1007. The FSLMRS states that an agency commits an
unfair labor practice when the agency "interferes with . . . any employee in the exercise by
the employee of any right under this chapter." 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1)(5) (1994). Specifically, a
federal agency commits an unfair labor practice under the FSLMRS when the agency
"refuses to consult or negotiate in good faith with a labor organization." 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(5)
(1994).
8. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309, 52 FL.R.A. 475, 479 (1996), enforce
denied, 132 F3d 157 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 1003. The FLP~s rationale for this
decision was that it had previously found a substantially identical proposal to be negotiable.
Id. The FLRA has held that an agency commits an unfair labor practice when the agency
refuses to negotiate over a proposal that is substantially identical to one the FLRA earlier
found to be negotiable. Local 1309, 52 FL.R.A. at 479. See Fort Stewart Ass'n of Educators,
37 F.L.R.A. 409, 420 (1990).
9. Local 1309, 52 FLR.A at 480. See National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 810
F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the FSLMRS imposed a duty to bargain midterm
in order to fulfill the "statutory goal of equalizing the positions of labor and management at
the bargaining table"); National Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.LR.A 162, 166 (1987)
(adopting the position of the D.C. Circuit with respect to midterm bargaining).
10. Local 1309, 52 EL.R.A. at 483. The order provided in pertinent part that "the
[Agency] shall bargain in good faith with the National Federation of Federal Employees,
Local 1309 over the proposal authorizing midterm bargaining." Id.
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enforcement of the FLRA order."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor of the Agency
and denied enforcement of the FLRA order.12 Judge Phillips, writing
for the court, concluded that the FSLMRS did not impose a duty on
a federal agency to negotiate midterm. 13 Consequently, the Agency
did not have a duty to negotiate over a clause in a collective
bargaining agreement that would require the Agency to bargain
midterm. 14 The Union and the FLRA petitioned for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.1 5 The Court granted certiorari
because of the split of authority between the Fourth Circuit and
the District of Columbia Circuit regarding the requirements of the
16
FSLRMS with respect to midterm bargaining.
The Supreme Court focused on the issue of whether the FSLMRS
requires a federal agency to negotiate midterm with a labor union
during the period when a valid labor contract is in force.' 7 Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, held that the FSLMRS permits
midterm bargaining, but does not require an agency to bargain
midterm when an existing collective bargaining agreement is in
force. 18
Justice Breyer began by stating that the FSLMRS does not
expressly address midterm bargaining. 9 Based on a literal reading
of the statute's relevant sections, the majority concluded that the
FSLMRS may or may not require midterm bargaining because the
statutory language is ambiguous. 2° The majority opinion then
11. Department of Interior v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309, 132 F3d
157 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999).
12. Id. at 158.
13. Id.
14. Id. Judge Phillips wrote that "the overriding principle in this circuit remains the
same: an agency may not be required to negotiate midterm. . . . [A] clause requiring an
agency to engage in Union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the FSLMRS, and
* . . is nonnegotiable." Local 1309, 132 F.3d at 162 (quoting Department of Energy v. FLRA,
106 E3d 1158, 1163-64 (4th Cir. 1997)).
15. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1007. A writ of certiorari is the primary means by which
the Supreme Court of the United States determines what cases it will hear. BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1007.
17. Id. at 1107.
18. Id. at 1007. Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id. at 1005. Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, with Justices Scalia and Thomas joining in part one of the dissent.
Id. at 1011 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
19. Id. at 1007. The majority noted that the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the
FLRA agreed that the FSLMRS does not expressly mention midterm bargaining. Id.
20. Id.
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reviewed and rejected all of the Agency's numerous arguments that
the FSLMRS prohibits negotiating over union-initiated midterm
2
bargaining proposals. '
The Court began its analysis by addressing the Agency's three
statutory interpretation arguments. 22 First, the Agency argued that
the language of the statute itself illustrates that midterm bargaining
is not permitted because the words "arrive at" indicate that a
collective bargaining agreement is the end result of bargaining. 23
Therefore, under this argument, Congress did not intend the duty
to negotiate to encompass a midterm agreement because a midterm
agreement is an enhancement of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. 24 The majority rejected this interpretation because the
FSLMRS defines "collective bargaining agreement" in a circular
way; therefore, it would be reasonable to read the statute as
25
permitting agreements that resulted from midterm negotiations.
Second, the Agency argued that the phrase "collective bargaining
agreement" is a term of art, which only refers to endterm
agreements and necessarily excludes midterm agreements. 26 The
majority rejected this reasoning because the Agency was unable to
cite, and the Court was unable to locate, any authority that
excluded midterm agreements from the coverage of a collective
bargaining agreement. 27 Third, the Agency argued that the private
sector duty to bargain midterm is based on specific language used
in the National Labor Relations Act, 28 which is broader than the
21. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1008.
22. Id.
23. Id. The language "arrive at" is contained in section 7114(a)(4) of the FSLMRS,
which describes the duty to bargain as follows: "Any agency and any exclusive
representative in any appropriate unit in the agency ... shall meet and negotiate in good
faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement . . . " 5 U.S.C. §
7114(a)(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
24. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1008. The Agency argued that "arriving at" means that the
end-term contract is the only permissible form of collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
1008.
25. Id. The FSLMRS defines "collective bargaining agreement" as an "agreement
entered into as a result of collective bargaining," and "defines collective baigaining" as
involving the meeting of employer and employee representatives at reasonable times to
consult and bargain in a good faith effort to reach agreement with respect to conditions of
employment. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(8), (12) (1994).
26. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1008.
27. Id. at 1008. The majority noted it was unable to locate any, "statute, judicial
opinion, agency document, or treatise that says... collective bargaining agreement... must
necessarily exclude midterm agreements." Id.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). The NLRA is the private sector counterpart to the
FSLMRS. See infra text accompanying note 66.
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language used by Congress to define the collective bargaining
obligation in the FSLMRS.2 9 Justice Breyer noted that reliance on
the private sector statute would not help the Agency's case because
the private sector statute and the public sector statute differ
considerably. 30
Next, the Court addressed the public policy implication of
permitting midterm bargaining. 31 The Agency, echoing the reasoning
of the Fourth Circuit, theorized that by permitting midterm
bargaining, a public union would have an incentive to avoid
negotiating matters in endterm agreements in favor of making
proposals during the term contract. 32 The Agency argued that the
Union would be inclined to wait until midterm before bringing a
proposal it wants because there would be less chance of a
compromise on the proposal, given there would not be other
negotiating issues on the bargaining table.3 This would circumvent
the public policy favoring collective bargaining.34 The majority
refuted this argument by citing the public policy concerns of
resolving a health or safety issue that arose midterm and that can
only be resolved through the use of midterm bargaining. 35 The
majority construed the FSLMRS as favoring the public policy of
collectively solving all labor problems that arise, including those
29. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1008. The Agency contended that the private sector duty
to bargain midterm is based on language in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA7) that
is materially different from the language in the FSLMRS. Id. The difference is that the NLRA
defines collective bargaining to include "negotiation with respect to... or negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). The Agency
contended that the use of "or any question arising thereunder" means the private sector
employer has a duty to negotiate matters regardless of whether it would lead to a written
contract or end-term agreement and the absence of such broad language in the FSLMRS
means the federal agency has no such duty to negotiate midterm. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at
1008.
30. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1008. Justice Breyer distinguished the NLRA from the
FSLMRS because the statutes cover different subject matter and collective bargaining in the
federal sector is not the same as collective bargaining in the private sector. Id.
31.

Id.

32. Id. at 1008. See SSA v. FLRA, 956 F.2d 1280, 1288 (4th Cir. 1992), overruled by 119
S. Ct. 1003 (1999) (holding that mandatory midterm bargaining would contravene many of
the basic purposes of the FSLMRS).
33. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1008. Public employees may not strike. 5 U.S.C. § 7116
(b)(7) (1994). When Congress enacted the FSLMRS it provided that in the event of an
impasse in negotiations, the parties must go to binding arbitration before the Federal Service
Impasse Panel. 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(1) (1994).
34. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1008.
35. Id. at 1009. The Court stated that without midterm bargaining it would be
impossible for the parties to reach a collective solution to such a problem. Id.
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that arise midterm. 36 In addition, the majority concluded that the
FLRA was the appropriate body to determine federal workplace
policy as envisioned by Congress in the FSLMRS.37 The Court
determined that FLRA decisions should be entitled to considerable
judicial deference because the FSLMRS is capable of several
interpretations; hence, the Court should not restrict the FLR!s
interpretation of the FSLMRS. 3s
The Court then addressed the Agency's argument that the
predecessors to the FSLMRS prohibited union-initiated midterm
bargaining, an indication that the FSLMRS prohibits such
bargaining as well.3 9 The Agency contended that the executive

order predating the FSLMRS precluded midterm bargaining. 40 The
Agency cited one case in which the Assistant Secretary of Labor
ruled that the executive order did not require midterm bargaining. 4 1
The Federal Labor Relations Council, predecessor to the FLRA, did
not review the case. 42 The majority concluded that one case did not
establish enough evidence of historical practice to warrant
precedential value. 43 The Agency also relied on a Senate report of a
36. Id. Congress has made a legislative finding that statutorily protecting the right of
employees to bargain collectively "contributes to the effective conduct of public business." 5
U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1)(b) (1994).
37. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1009. Justice Breyer concluded that the Agency's public
policy arguments illustrated the need for the FLRA to refine the statutory collective
bargaining obligation. Id.
38. Id. at 1009. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (holding that where an agency ruling is based on the application of a statute, and
the statute is ambiguous as to the issue at hand, the court must merely ask if the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute). See also 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)
(1994) (stating the standard of review for FLRA rulings). "An agency ruling may be set aside
only if arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the
law." Department of Interior v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309, 132 F.3d 157,
161 (1997) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1994)).
39. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1009.
40. Id. See Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.YR. § 861 (1966-1970 Comp.), amended by Exec.
Order Nos. 11616, 11636, and 11838, 3 C.ER. §§ 605, 634, 957 (1971-1975 Comp.) (stating that
agencies and unions meet to "negotiate an agreement, or any question arising thereunder").
Id.
41. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1009. See Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., Capital Exch.
Region Headquarters, Case No. 1212-6657 (CA), 2 Ruling on Requests for Review of Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations 561-562 (1976); see also National
Treasury Employees Union, 17 F.LR.A 731, 736 (1985) (concluding that midterm bargaining
was not required under the Executive Order).
42. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1009.
43. Id. at 1009. The majority noted that a treatise supported the proposition that, under
the executive order, both unions and agencies had a continuing duty to bargain throughout
the term of a basic labor contract. Id. (citing H. ROBINSON, NEGo'nIABIUrY IN THE FEDERAL
SECTOR 10-11 (1981)).
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bill that was not enacted into law but contained similar language to
the present FSLMRS." The report indicated that parties may
bargain over proposals that lead to a basic collective bargaining
agreement. 45 Justice Breyer dismissed the notion that the Senate
intended to prohibit midterm bargaining based on the report by
stating that "any such implication is simply too distant to control
our reading of the statute."4
Finally, the Court turned to the Agency's alternative argument
that the management rights provision of the FSLMRS provides the
only opportunity for midterm bargaining under the FSLMRS.47 The
Fourth Circuit agreed with the Agency that midterm bargaining
under the management rights provision of the FSLMRS is limited to
specific subject matter contained in the provision.48 The Agency
argued that any subject not enumerated in this section of the
44. Id. at 1009. See S. REP. No. 95-969, at 104 (1978).
45. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1009. The report states, "parties have a mutual duty to
bargain with respect to changes in established personnel policies proposed by management,
and negotiable proposals initiated by either the agency or the union . .. in the context of
negotiations leading to a basic collective bargaining agreement." S. REP. No. 95-969, at 104
(1978).
46. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1009. See National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA,
810 E2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that "[a]ny distinction between basic and midterm
bargaining did not survive the rejection by Congress of the Senate's restrictive view of the
rights of labor and the importance of collective bargaining"), overruled by Local 1309, 119 S.
Ct. 1003 (1999).
47. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1010. The management rights sections of the FSLMRS
provide in pertinent part:
[Niothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any management official of any
agency-to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and
internal security practices of the agency; and . . . to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and
retain employees . . . to assign work, . . . [and to] take whatever actions may be
necessary to carry out the agency mission during emergencies. [N]othing in this
section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization from negotiating- (1) at
the election of the agency, on the numbers, types, and grades of employees or
positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of duty, or
on the technology, methods, and means of performing work; (2) procedures which
management officials of the agency will observe in exercising any authority under this
section; or (3) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the
exercise of any authority under this section by management officials.
5 U.S.C. § 7106(a), (b) (1994).
48. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1010. Section (a) of the management rights provision
takes listed subjects out of the sphere of collective bargaining, while section (b) allows
bargaining on the matters that section (a) withdrew. Id. The Agency argued that section (b)
authorizes midterm bargaining in matters enumerated in that section, thus if a subject is not
included in that provision, it is prohibited by negative implication. Id. See also SSA v. FLRA,
956 F2d 1280, 1284 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that the FSLMRS authorizes midterm bargaining
only with respect to changes in condition of employment initiated by the agency), overruled
by 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999).
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statute, such as the Union proposal for a generic midterm
bargaining provision, is not a proper subject for midterm
bargaining.4 9 The Supreme Court majority dismissed this argument
because the management rights provision, when read as a whole,
only indicates the proper subjects of bargaining; it does not
50
indicate when that bargaining may take place.
The majority concluded that the FSLMRS is sufficiently
ambiguous to warrant a finding that the statute may or may not
allow midterm bargaining. 5 ' Finding the statute ambiguous, the
majority disagreed with both the Fourth Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit with respect to what the FSLMRS requires in relation to
midterm bargaining.5 2 Justice Breyer opined that this ambiguity is
evidence of congressional intent to delegate to the FLRA the power
to determine when and if midterm bargaining is required. Justice
Breyer also stated that delegating this power to the FLRA fulfills its
purpose of providing expertise in the administration of the
FSLRMS, by ensuring that the principles embodied by the statute
are developed fully in practice.M
49. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1010.
50. Id. at 1010. Justice Breyer noted that section (b) of the management rights
provision does not compel a duty to bargain midterm because the relevant language,
"nothing in this section shall preclude" means only that the rights given to management in
section (a) would not foreclose bargaining on related matters. Id. In other words, section (b)
is an exception to section (a). Id. Further, the text of 5 U.S.C § 7106 addresses the subject
of bargaining, not when bargaining may take place. Id. But see infra text accompanying note
58.
51. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1010. The majority wrote, "we find ambiguity created by
the Statute's use of general language that might, or might not, encompass various forms of
midterm bargaining." Id.
52. Id. Because the majority found the statute to be ambiguous as to midterm
bargaining, it disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's and the D.C. Circuit's analysis of the duty to
bargain midterm under the statute. Id. Compare SSA v. FLRA 956 F.2d 1280, 1284 (4th Cir.
1992) (holding that "Congress addressed duty to bargain in language that seems to
contemplate that such a duty arises as to only one, basic agreement") with National Treasury
Employees Union v. FLRA, 810 F.2d 295, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the language of
the FSLMRS does not support the FLRAs conclusion that an agency has no duty to negotiate
union initiated midterm proposals).
53. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1010. Ambiguity is evidence that Congress delegated to
FLRA the power to determine the facets of midterm bargaining under the FSLMRS. See 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (stating that reviewing courts will set aside agency decisions that are
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law); Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that when an
agency construes an ambiguous statute that it is charged with implementing, the Court will
not overturn the agency's construction so long as the interpretation is based on a permissible
construction of the statute).
54. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1011. The function of FLRA is to "develop specialized
expertise in the field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the
principles and goals set forth in the act." Id. at 1011. Further, the "FLRA is entitled to
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The Court remanded the case in order for the FLRA to make an
independent determination as to whether federal agencies are
under a duty to bargain midterm, recognizing that under the
FSLMRS, midterm bargaining is permitted, but not obligatory. 55
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, wrote that the FSLMRS clearly does
not require federal agencies to bargain midterm because the
language of the statute is not ambiguous.5 In support of her
conclusion, Justice O'Connor opined that the relevant portion of
the statute imposes a duty on agencies only to bargain for the
purpose of reaching a collective bargaining agreement. 57 She also
noted that the statute permits midterm bargaining only in a few
limited circumstances, thus the statute could not be taken as
authorizing midterm bargaining generally.8 Specifically, the dissent
argued that the management rights section of the statute defines a
statutory obligation to bargain midterm over the enumerated
59
subjects contained therein and no others.
The dissent concluded that Congress did not intend midterm
bargaining to be included in the definition of collective bargaining
under the FSLMRS, based on a comparison with the National Labor
Relations Act. 6° In support of her position, Justice O'Connor opined
considerable deference when it exercises its special function of applying the general
provisions of the act to the complexities of federal labor relations." BATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S.
89, 97 (1983) (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)).
55. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1011. The majority believed that the FLRAs initial
determination that the FSLMRS requires midterm bargaining was not independent; it was
based on a precedent from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. See
National Treasury Employees Union, 17 F.LR.A. 731 (1985). In that case, the FLRA held that
the FSLMRS did not require the agency to bargain midterm. Id. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
held the statute must be read to require midterm bargaining. National Treasury Employees
Union v. FLRA, 810 F.2d 295 (1987). On remand, the FLRA adopted the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning and held the statute required an agency to bargain midterm over Union-initiated
proposals not addressed in the basic agreement. National Treasury Employees Union, 29
FL.R.A. 162, 166 (1987).
56. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1012 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1012 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1994) (stating that
the plain language of the section defines a general duty to bargain only in order to arrive at
a collective bargaining agreement). Id.
58. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1012 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor points
out that 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b) obligates an agency to bargain midterm only in the enumerated
matters within that section. Id. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36
(1992) (holding that every word in statute is given effect by reading inconsistent paragraphs
within a section as a whole).
59. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1013 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Analyzing 5 U.S.C. §
7106(b)(2)-(3), the dissent noted that these sections of the statute were mandates on federal
agencies to bargain midterm. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1013 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But
see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1013 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Under the NLRA, the duty

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:181

that because federal agencies must pay Union negotiators' salaries
during negotiations, the public sector unions, unlike their private
sector counterparts, have an incentive to engage in extended
bargaining. 61 The dissent further argues that requiring federal
agencies to bargain midterm would give a union an unfair
advantage over the agency because a public sector union has
nothing to lose by bargaining midterm to impasse, whereas its
private sector counterparts must enforce their views through
strikes and other costly measures. 6 Justice O'Connor repudiates
the FLRA's alternative argument that even if the FSLMRS does not
require federal agencies to bargain midterm, the agency must still
bargain over proposals in endterm contracts that include midterm
bargaining clauses by pointing out that under her interpretation,
such a provision would be a violation of the FSLMRS.6
Justices Thomas and Scalia did not join in part two of the
dissent. In part two, Justice O'Connor argues that even if the
statute were ambiguous, she nevertheless would not grant the
FLRA judicial deference in the instant case under Chevron because
in Good SamaritanHospital v. Shalala,64 the Court held that when
to bargain includes the "negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder." 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). The duty to bargain under the FSLMRS is "to arrive at a collective
bargaining agreement." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1994). Justice O'Connor seems to agree that
the FSLMRS statute should not be read in pari materia, but that a comparison of the two
statutes would be helpful in resolving doubtful language in one of the statutes. Local 1309,
119 S. Ct. at 1013. See Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-132 (1943) (holding
that when Congress uses similar language in two different statutes, the first of which the
federal courts have interpreted prior to congressional enactment of the latter statute, the
court may construe language in the latter statute consistently with the former).
61. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1014 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See 5 U.S.C. § 7131(a)
(1994) (stating that, "Any employee representing a [union] in the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement... shall be authorized official time... during the time the employee
otherwise would be in a duty status"); National Treasury Employees Union, 17 EL.R.A. 731,
736-737 (1985) (holding that requiring agencies to bargain over union-initiated midterm
proposals would encourage the dispersal of the collective bargaining process).
62. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1014 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Ferris,
Union-initiated Mid-Term Bargaining: A Catalyst in Reshaping Conflict Pattern, 5
NEGOTIATION J. 407, 411-412 (1989) (stating that a union can withhold proposals during
end-term negotiations that it believes would be traded away and subsequently bring the
proposal during a single issue midterm negotiation when it would not be subject to trade
off).
63. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1014-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
argues that because 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(1) requires federal agencies to bargain on matters
only "to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law" and Congress did not include a
midterm bargaining requirement in the FSLMRS, it would be inconsistent with the FSLMRS
to require an agency to bargain end-term about including a midterm bargaining clause into a
collective bargaining agreement. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1015 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. 505 U.S. 402 (1993).
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an agency reverses its interpretation of a statute, it may be entitled
to less deference than if the agency consistently held one view. 65
The private sector duty to bargain midterm over a union-initiated
proposal under the National Labor Relations Act was first
addressed by the federal appellate courts in the 1952 case of NLRB
v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co.6 The issue before the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Jacobs Manufacturing was
whether the private employer was under a statutory duty to
negotiate a union proposal under 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) when the
subject of the proposal was not addressed in the reopening clause
of the preexisting labor contract. 67 The Second Circuit construed
section 158(d) according to its plain meaning.68 Judge Chase
concluded that the proper interpretation of the statute would not
relieve an employer from bargaining on subjects that were neither
discussed during negotiations of the basic contract nor included in
the terms of the contract.6 In reaching this construction of section
65. Local 1309, 119 S. Ct. at 1015 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 38; Good
Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 505 U.S. 402 (1993) (holding that consistency of agency position
is a factor in determining the amount of deference due agency position); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, n.30 (1987) (holding that the agency's interpretation of a
statute was not entitled to heightened judicial deference because the agency's position was
inconsistent over time).
66. 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). In Jacobs Manufacturing, the employer entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with its union membership on July 15, 1948. Id. The
agreement contained a clause that allowed either party to initiate a meeting one year from
the date of enactment in order to discuss employee salaries. Id. The agreement was silent as
to employee pensions. Id. One year later the employee union proposed a salary increase
along with a proposal for a pension plan. Id. The employer refused to negotiate the creation
of an employee pension plan because the clause in the agreement authorizing parties to the
agreement to meet after enactment of the agreement did not mention employee pension
plans. Id.
67. Jacobs Mfg., 196 F.2d at 683-84. The duty to bargain collectively is set out at
section 158(d) of the NLRA which provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994). A reopening clause is a clause in the basic labor contract that
allows the parties to make proposals at a future date concerning issues as they arise, and
requires the parties to negotiate such proposals. National Treasury Employees Union, 17
F.L.R.A. 731, 736 (1985).
68. Jacobs Mfg., 196 F2d at 684.
69. Id. The court observed that the language of section 158(d) creates an exception to
the general purpose of the NLRA in that it limits the circumstances in which employers
would have a duty to bargain with employee unions in situations where there are "[tierms
and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period." Id. Judge Chase wrote the
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158(d), the court noted that the general purpose of the act to
prevent industrial disputes by requiring collective bargaining should
70
be "given effect" unless there is a contrary provision in the act.
Applying this construction of section 158(d) to the facts in Jacobs
Manufacturing, the court held that the employer was under a
statutory duty to bargain on the subject of employee pensions even
though pensions were not mentioned during negotiations leading to
71
the labor contract or included in any terms of the contract.
According to the Jacobs Manufacturing court, employers are only
relieved from bargaining on subjects when those subjects were
already addressed in the preexisting labor contract.72
Formal labor-management relations within the federal sector
began in 1962 with an executive order.7 3 President John E Kennedy
issued Executive Order 1098874 on January 17, 1962 and with it
ushered in the first formal declaration of labor-management
relations in the federal service.7 5 This order declared that federal
employee participation in the negotiation of policies that affect
them furthers the public business, and that such participation
76
improved employee-management relations in the federal service.
The order provided a framework for federal labor relations by
listing both the subjects of bargaining and items that were exempt
from bargaining.7 7 Section 6(b) of the order defined the bargaining
obligation in language similar to the NLRA, as extending to matters
opinion of the court, joined by Judges Learned Hand and Augustus Hand. Id.
70. Id. The general purpose of the NLRA is to impose a duty on employers to bargain
with unions over issues so that industrial disputes that could disrupt commerce can be
avoided. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. BATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 92 (1983).
74. Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.ER. 521 (1959-1963 Comp.), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
7101 (1994).
75. Id.
76. Id. The preamble of the Order provides in part:
[Plarticipation of employees in the formulation and implementation of personnel
policies affecting them contributes to effective conduct of public business ... and...
the efficient administration of the government . . . require that orderly and
constructive relationships be maintained between employee organizations and
management officials . . . and . . . employee - management relations within the

Federal Service should be improved by providing employees an opportunity for
greater participation in the formulation and implementation of policies and procedures
affecting the conditions of their employment ....
Id.
77. Id. The order directs federal managers to meet with employee organizations to
confer about matters subject to federal law affecting working conditions while management
retains the right to assign employees, direct employees, etc. Id.
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negotiated in an agreement "or any question arising thereunder."78
Under this executive order, federal agencies were tasked with
developing policies to implement the order.79
On October 29, 1969, President Richard Nixon revoked Executive
Order 10988 with Executive Order 11491,80 which expanded federal
labor management relations by establishing the Federal Labor
Relations Council and the Federal Service Impasse Panel.81 Section
11 of this order defines the employer duty to bargain in language
similar to that of the previous order.82 The executive order federal
labor-management relations scheme was not subject to judicial
review because it was administered by management officials in the
executive branch.3
Relevant case law under Executive Order 11491 is sparse;
however, in the 1976 case of Army and Air Force Exchange
Service' the union filed an unfair labor practice against the agency,
alleging that the agency violated its duty to bargain midterm by
refusing to negotiate a union proposal, and the acting regional
administrator dismissed the complaint on the ground that
Executive Order 11491 did not mandate a duty on the part of an
agency to bargain midterm.88 The Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Labor-Management Relations affirmed the dismissal, but on the
ground that the agency in fact bargained on the issue when
negotiating the basic labor agreement between the union and the
6 The FLRC did not review the decision of the Assistant
agency.8
78. Id.
79. Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521.
80. Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.ER. 861 (1966-1970 Comp.), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
7101 (1994).
81. Id. The Council consisted of the chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the
Secretary of Labor, and an official from the Executive Office of the President. Id. The
Council was created to administer the Order. Id.
82. Id. Section 11(a) of the Order states in part:
An agency and a labor organization... shall meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to personnel policies and practices . . . affecting working
They may negotiate an agreement, or any question arising thereunder
conditions ....
... determine appropriate techniques, consistent with ... this order to assist in such
negotiation... and execute a written agreement or memorandum of understanding.
Id.
83. BATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 92 (1983). The Assistant Secretary of Labor decided
unfair labor practice complaints and violations of standards of conduct for labor
organizations. Id. Decisions of the Assistant Secretary were reviewable by the FLRC, whose
decision was final. Id.
84. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., Capital Exchange Region Headquarters, Case
No. 22-6657(CA), 2 Rulings on Request for Review 561 (1976).
85. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., 2 Rulings on Request for Review at 561.
86. Id. The union proposed using an employee breakroom to conduct a union
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Secretary.87
Modem labor relations in the federal sector began with the 1978
passage of the FSLMRS, which is Title VII of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA'). s8 Congress declared in the findings
and purpose section of the FSLMRS that collective bargaining is in
the public interest, and that the FSLMRS should be interpreted to
contribute to an efficient and effective government.8 9 In BATF v.
FLRA, 90 the Court commented that Congress passed the FSLMRS to
strengthen the bargaining position of employee unions in order to
make the collective bargaining process more efficient and effective
than it was under the previous Executive Order program. 91
The question of whether the FSLMRS imposed a duty on federal
agencies to bargain midterm during an existing labor agreement
was initially answered in the negative by the FLRA in National
Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, ("IRS i),92 the case which
crystallized the D.C. Circuit's position that the FSLMRS does not
require midterm bargaining. 93 In IRS I, the Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ) held that the agency committed an unfair labor
practice by refusing to negotiate the union's midterm proposals,
because the FSLMRS imposed a duty on federal employers to
bargain midterm. 4 In reaching this holding, the ALJ relied on the
private sector precedent of NLRB v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co. 95
The ALJ also noted that nothing in the legislative history nor in a
literal reading of the FSLMRS stands for the proposition that
midterm bargaining is prohibited under the FSLMRS. 96 Finally, the
ALJ commented that the decision in Army and Air Force Exchange
Service97 is not controlling because that case's outcome rested
membership drive. Id. The existing agreement between the parties provided for union
membership drives, but the use of agency facilities was not included in the agreement. Id.
87. National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, 17 FL.R.A. 731, 746 (1985).
88. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) ( codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994)).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994). See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
90. 464 U.S. 89 (1983).
91. Id. at 107.
92. 17 FL.R.A. 731 (1985) [hereinafter "IRS I"], vacated, 810 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The union and the agency entered into a collective bargaining agreement on January 26,
1981. Id. On July 29, 1981, the union submitted a request for negotiations on nine proposals
that concerned working conditions at the agency. Id. The agency refused to negotiate the
proposals. Id. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 745-46.
95. Id. (relying on NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952)).
96. Id.
97. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., 2 Rulings on Request for Review at 561.
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partly on other grounds. 98
The agency appealed the AIJ decision to the FLRA, and the
FLRA reversed, finding for the agency and holding that the
FSLMRS did not require a federal agency to bargain over
union-initiated midterm proposals absent a reopening clause in the
basic labor contract. 99 In reaching its decision, the FLRA examined
the purpose of the FSLMRS in light of the representational rights
and duties of agencies and unions.'1° The FLRA opined that the
representational rights sections of the FSLMRS, read in conjunction
with the enumerated purposes of the statute, make it clear that one
of the congressional goals behind collective bargaining was to
impose a mutual obligation on unions and public agencies to
negotiate collectively a bargaining agreement on issues affecting
conditions of employment. 1 1 The goal was that such agreements
would lead to the amicable settlement of disputes between unions
and federal agencies, and would thus foster stability in the
workplace. 1°2 The FLRA, based on the legislative history of the
statute, held that it was Congress' intent to limit collective
bargaining to negotiations leading to a collective bargaining
agreement.1°3
98. IRS 1, 17 FLR.A. at 745-46. The ALI commented that the Assistant Secretary
affirmed the dismissal in part because the parties negotiated provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement that were on point to the issue in dispute; therefore, this would not be
a true midterm proposal. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87 for a discussion of
Army and Air Force Exchange Serv.
99. IRS 1, 17 FL.R.A. at 736. See supra note 67 for a definition of a reopening clause.
100. Id. at 733-34. The FSLMRS lists the following rights and duties of agencies and
unions: "A labor organization . . . is . . . entitled to act for, and negotiate collective
bargaining agreements . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1) (1994). "Any agency and exclusive
representative . . . shall meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a
collective bargaining agreement. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1994). "The duty of an agency
and an exclusive representative to negotiate in good faith ... shall include the obligation (1)
to approach the negotiations with a sincere resolve to reach a collective bargaining
agreement." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b) (1994). Finally, "if agreement is reached, [an agency and an
exclusive representative have the duty] to execute on the request of any party to the
negotiation a written document embodying the agreed terms, and to take such steps as are
necessary to implement such agreement." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(5) (1994).
101. IRS I, 17 FLR.A. at 734.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 735. The FLRA cited to a Senate report explaining the Senate version of a
bill that was rejected by the House of Representatives. Id. The report explained the Senate
bill's version of the representational rights and duties of parties to labor agreements. Id. It
contained language similar to the House of Representatives' version of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1),
which later became law. The Senate report provides in part:
[A] labor organization is... entitled to act for and negotiate.. . agreements covering
all employees in the unit... [.] The parties have a mutual duty to bargain not only
with respect to those changes in established personnel policies proposed by
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Next, the FLRA opined that to impose a duty on managers to
bargain midterm would erode the stability that the basic contract is
designed to provide in various sections of the FSLMRS. 1 4 The
FLRA reasoned that by requiring midterm bargaining, union
negotiators would have an incentive to withhold proposals from
basic contract negotiations rather than working with management
to reach a comprehensive labor contract. 105 After the basic contract
was enacted, the union could then submit proposals on a piecemeal
basis, without going through the give-and-take process of basic
contract negotiation. 106 As a result, the bargaining process would be
dispersed throughout the term of the basic contract, undermining
the stability of .the basic agreement, resulting in less effective
government.107 In summary, the FLRA rested its decision on the
literal reading of the FSLMRS, with support from the statute's
legislative history as well as public policy grounds.1 °s
The National Treasury Employees Union petitioned the U.S.
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit for review of the
FLRA decision. °9 The court addressed the question of whether the
FSLMRS imposed a duty on employers to negotiate union-initiated
midterm proposals, and concluded that the statute does impose a
duty on federal agencies to negotiate midterm during the period of
an existing labor contract."0 The court began by examining the
relevant portions of the statute relied upon by the FLRA, and
concluded that there was no express support in the statute for the
proposition that midterm bargaining is not required by the
FSLMRS." l
Next, the court questioned the FLRAs reliance on the Senate
report in the legislative history of the statute, because the report
pertained to the Senate version of the FSLMRS."' According to
management, but also concerning negotiable proposals initiated by either the agency
or the exclusive representative in the context of negotiations leading to a basic
collective bargaining agreement.
S. REP. No. 95-969, at 104 (1978).
104. IRS 1,17 F.LR.A. at 736.
105.

Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. National TYeasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 810 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
110. National Treasury, 810 F.2d at 296.
111. Id. at 298. The court analyzed sections 7114(a)(1), (4), and sections 7103(a)(8),
(12), and commented that the statute does not mention midterm bargaining or distinguish
between any other type of bargaining. Id.
112. Id. at 298. Judge Re distinguished the Senate report on the ground that the
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Judge Re, the Senate view of collective bargaining mentioned in the
report was rejected by Congress when it passed the House version
of the Bill, because the purpose of the FSLMRS was to expand the
scope of negotiation beyond its role under the Executive Order
program. 113 If the more restrictive Senate version was the intended
result of Congress, then it would have adopted the Senate version
of the Bill.114 In addition, the court compared midterm bargaining
under private sector labor law with the FSLMRS, and concluded
that the analysis in Jacobs Manufacturing is helpful in interpreting
midterm bargaining under the FSLMRS.1 5
Finally, Judge Re noted that the FLRA in its decision below
stated that Congress authorized agency-initiated
midterm
bargaining, which would create the same type of instability with
collective bargaining agreements that union-initiated midterm
bargaining would create. 16 In construing the purpose of the
FSLMRS, the court noted that Congress' goal in passing the statute
was to strengthen the position of labor in the collective bargaining
process." 7 Therefore, the court reasoned that giving management
the only opportunity to present midterm proposals would place the
unions at an unfair disadvantage rather than strengthening the
position of the unions." 8 As a result, after considering private
sector labor law, congressional intent, and basic principals of labor
law, the court concluded that the FLRAs decision below was not in
accordance with the law and remanded the case to the FLRA." 9
adoption of the House version of the bill supported congressional rejection of the restrictive
view of bargaining evidenced in the Senate report. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Judge Re noted, "[Tihe language of section 7114(a) is as broad and unqualified
as other sections in the statute, and does not reflect the restrictive view of the [Senate]
expressed in the Senate report." Id.
115. National Treasury, 810 F.2d at 300. See Library of Congress v. FLA, 699 F2d
1280, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that precedent developed under the NLRA is entitled to
serious consideration with respect to the FSLMRS); see supra note 66 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Jacobs Manufacturing.
116. National Treasury, 810 F2d at 300.
117. Id. (quoting BATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 107 (1983)).
118. Id. The court noted that public sector labor relations must afford special
protections to management due to the nature of the governmental functions to be carried
out by the agencies, but that Congress took this into account by limiting the subjects of
bargaining rather than the circumstances of bargaining. Id. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
119. Id. The decision of the FLRA was not in accordance with the law because it was
contrary to the intent of Congress in passing the FSLMRS. Id. The scope of judicial review
of agency adjudication's is set out at 5 U.S.C. § 706, which provides in pertinent part, "The
reviewing court shall-(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
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On remand, the FLRA adopted the position of the ALJ and the
District of Columbia Circuit, concluding that Congress' intent was
to promote collective bargaining in the federal government by
20
allowing union-initiated midterm bargaining in some contexts.
The FLRA also agreed with the District of Columbia Circuit with
respect to private sector labor precedent, and applied the rationale
of Jacobs Manufacturingin the interpretation of the FSLMRS.' 2' As
a result, the FLRA held that the FSLMRS imposes a duty on the
part of federal sector managers to negotiate union-initiated midterm
bargaining proposals on subjects not contained in the basic labor
contract and on subjects that have been waived by the union,
22
either expressly or through the parties' bargaining history.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in SSA v. FLRA 23 held
contrary to the FLRAs interpretation of midterm bargaining under
the FSLMRS. 124 In SSA v. FLRA the court rejected the FLRAs
interpretation of the FSLMRS, set aside the FLRs order, and held
that the FSLMRS does not require federal managers to bargain
midterm over union-initiated proposals. 25 In the proceeding below,
the FLRA adopted the ALl's finding that under FLRA precedent, the
agency was obligated to negotiate the union-initiated midterm
proposals. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to
to be-(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
the law . . . " 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
120. National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, 29 F.L.R.A. 162, 164 (1987) [hereinafter
"IRS II"]. In its holding, the FLRA commented that an agency has a duty to negotiate
union-initiated midterm proposals as long as the proposals do not cover matters in the
existing collective bargaining agreement and "absent a clear and unmistakable" waiver of
bargaining rights by the union as to the proposal in question. Id.
121. IRS II, 29 FL.R.A. at 164. The FLRA now agreed with the Jacobs Manufacturing
court that the general purpose of the Act should be given effect unless there is a contrary
provision in the Act. Id.
122. Id.
123. 956 E2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1992), overruled by National Fed'n of Fed. Employees,
Local 1309 v. Department of the Interior, 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999).
124. SSA, 956 E2d at 1280.
125. Id. The Social Security Administration and the American Federation of
Government Employees negotiated a basic collective bargaining agreement that contained a
"reopener" clause that allowed negotiations during the term of the agreement only to the
extent that both parties agreed to consent to negotiations. Id. In 1987, the union proposed
negotiations on several subjects that were not addressed in the basic agreement. Id. The
agency ("SSA') refused to negotiate over the subjects, arguing that agencies are not required
to bargain midterm over union-initiated proposals, and in the alternative that with the
reopener provision the union waived it's right to raise midterm negotiations. Id. The union
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA. Id. The FLRA held that the SSA
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to negotiate the union proposals and ordered
the SSA to negotiate the proposals. Id.
126. AFGE v. SSA, 39 FL.R.A. No. 52 (1991), enforce denied, 956 F.2d 1280 (1992),
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enforce the FLRA order because the court concluded that the
FLRA interpretation of the FSLMRS requiring federal agencies to
bargain midterm as to union-initiated proposals was contrary to the
express intent of Congress. 2 7 As a result, the FLR s interpretation
of the statute was not entitled to deference because the statute was
not ambiguous with respect to midterm bargaining. 12 8
Judge Wilkinson, writing for the Fourth Circuit, examined the
relevant text of the statute, its legislative history, and the propriety
of comparisons with private sector labor law. 129 First, the court
found that the language of the statute indicated that Congress did
not envision union-initiated midterm bargaining under the FSLMRS
because in defining the duty to bargain, Congress used the
language, "for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining
agreement." 30 Furthermore, the court noted that section
7106(b)(2)-(3) of the statute indicates that an agency is obligated to
bargain midterm when the agency changes conditions of
employment.1 3' Because the statute specifically addresses when
management is required to bargain midterm, the court reasoned
that Congress intended this to be the only instance when
management would be required to do so. 132 In addition, the court
questioned the District of Columbia Circuit's rejection of Senate
Report 969 in National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, by
contending that the reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit
was "unpersuasive" because the Senate version of the bill was
substantively identical to the House version that eventually became
law.'33 Furthermore, the court noted that the legislative history
made it clear that Congress did not intend to dramatically depart
overruled by National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Department of Interior, 119 S. Ct. 1003
(1999).
127. SSA, 956 F.2d at 1284.
128. Id. at 1283-84. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that an agency charged with interpreting a statute is
entitled to deference only if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue at hand, and that the court must always give effect to the express intent of Congress).
129. SSA, 956 E2d at 1284.
130. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1994)). See also 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(1) (1994)
(defining the obligation to bargain in good faith as including the obligation to negotiate with
the sincere resolve to reach a collective bargaining agreement).
131. SSA, 956 F2d at 1284. See supra note 36.
132. Id. at 1284. 5 U.S.C. § 7106 is the management rights provision of the FSLMRS
and does not expressly mention midterm bargaining. Id.
133. Id. at 1285 (quoting Senate bill 2640, "An agency and an exclusive representative
shall have a duty to negotiate in good faith and in exercising such duty shall . . . approach
the negotiations with a sincere resolve to reach an agreement.") S. 2640, 95th Cong. §
7215(b)(1) (1978). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(4) (1994).
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from the executive order scheme in effect at the time the FSLMRS
was passed.'34 The court, citing BATF v. FLRA, 131 went on to state
that when the statute is ambiguous as to an issue, courts may seek
guidance from prior Executive Order administrative practice. 36 In
BATF the Supreme Court cautioned in a footnote that the FLRA is
not bound by administrative decisions under the Executive Order
program because the FSLMRS gives the FLRA the authority to
"establish policies and provide guidance in the federal labor
relations field. " 137 With regard to applying private sector labor law
to clarify whether the FSLMRS imposes a duty on agencies to
bargain midterm over union-initiated proposals, the court cited Fort
the
Stewart Schools v. FLRA'38 to support the proposition that
139
FSLMRS should not be read in pari materia with the NLRA.
Next, Judge Wilkinson cited various public policy arguments in
support of the view that Congress did not intend the FSLMRS to
impose a duty to bargain midterm. 14° As a result, the court
134. SSA v. FLRA, 956 E2d 1280, 1286 (4th Cir. 1992), overruled by National Fed'n of
Fed. Employees v. Department of Interior, 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999). The court noted that
Congressman Udall, who was the primary sponsor of the House bill, intended to codify the
Executive Order program in the U.S. Code. Mr. Udall stated:
What we really do [in enacting this bill] is to codify the 1962 action of President
Kennedy in setting up a basic framework of collective bargaining for Federal
employees ... So we are now going to put into the United States code instead of the
Federal Register this basic plan of President Kennedy's that has worked so well in the
last 15 years.
124 CONG. REc. H9633 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1978) (statement of Rep. Udall). Furthermore, 5
U.S.C. § 7135(b) provides:
Policies, regulations, and procedures established under Executive Order No. 11491 [as
amended] or any other Executive [O]rder, as in effect on the effective date of this
chapter, shall remain in full force and effect until revised or revoked by the President,
or unless superseded by specific provisions of this chapter or by regulations or
decisions issued pursuant to this chapter.
5 U.S.C. § 7135(b) (1994).
135. 464 U.S. 89, 103 (1983).
136. SSA, 956 F2d at 1286.
137. BATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 103 n.13 (1983) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1) (1994)).
The Court continued, "[Tihere are undoubtedly areas in which the FLRA, like the NLRB,
enjoys considerable freedom to apply its expertise to new problems, provided it remains
faithful to the fundamental policy choices made by congress." Id.
138. 495 U.S. 641 (1990).
139. SSA v. FLRA, 956 E2d 1280, 1286 (1991), overruled by National Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. Department of Interior, 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999). In pari materia is a rule of
statutory construction which means that statutes relating to the same subject matter should
be read together when one or both are ambiguous, so that the intent of the legislature with
respect to the ambiguous issue can be ascertained from the combination of the acts. BLACK'S
LAw DICIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).

140. SSA, 956 F.2d at 1287-88. Judge Willdnson explained that since 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)
of the FSLMRS provides for binding arbitration in the event that management and labor
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concluded that imposing a. duty on the part of federal managers to
bargain over a union-initiated midterm proposal would contravene
the purpose of the FSLMRS, which is to apply it in a way that
promotes an efficient and effective government.141 Judge Wilkinson
opined that permitting union-initiated midterm bargaining would
lead to instability in federal labor relations and diminish the
effectiveness of government by undermining the ability of
management to rely on basic collective bargaining agreements and
42
leading to "protracted conflict."
Finally, the Fourth Circuit attempted to refute the District of
Columbia Circuit's argument that not imposing a duty on the part
of federal managers to bargain midterm over union-initiated
proposals would frustrate the goal of the FSLMRS to strengthen the
employee unions' bargaining position.'" The court pointed out that
"numerous" portions of the FSLMRS restrict the bargaining rights
of employee unions, evidencing that Congress did not intend
144
federal agencies to be on an even keel with employee unions.
Four years after its decision in SSA, and seven months before its
decision in Local 1309, the Fourth Circuit again considered the
question of union-initiated midterm bargaining under the FSLMRS
in Department of Energy v. FLRA.' 45 The Energy Court held that a
government agency is under no obligation to bargain with respect
to a clause proposed by the union for insertion in a basic labor
contract that would authorize the union to make midterm proposals
during the term of the basic labor contract. 46 As a result, the court
found that the FSLMRS prohibited union-initiated midterm
bargaining. 47 The court relied on its decision in SSA and concluded
cannot reach agreement on an issue, public unions could use this as a tactical advantage
over management by constantly bringing proposals midterm rather than negotiating on all
issues of interest as part of a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement. Id. In addition,
5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) requires union negotiators to be paid by the government while engaged in
negotiations; this creates less incentive on the part of public unions to streamline the
negotiating process in a cost effective manner for both the union and government. Id.
141. SSA, 956 F.2d at 1288. See 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (1994) (describing the purpose of the
FSLMRS).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The court cited the management rights provision in the FSLMRS, 5 U.S.C. §
7106(a), which takes enumerated subjects from the scope of collective bargaining by
reserving those subjects as exclusive management prerogatives. Id.
145. 106 F.3d 1158 (4th Cir. 1997).
146. Id.
147. Id. During negotiations for a new labor contract, the employee union proposed the
following clause: "The Employer will be obligated to bargain . . . on any Union proposed
changes in the conditions of employment during the term of this agreement. . . ." Id. The
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that because union-initiated midterm bargaining contravenes the
FSLMRS, the Department of Energy was acting in accordance with
section 7114(c)(2) of the FSLMRS when it disapproved the
agreement. 148 In summary, the Fourth Circuit's view of whether
midterm bargaining is permitted or compelled by the FSLMRS was
diametrically opposed to the view held by the District of Columbia
149
Circuit and the FLRA.
The Supreme Court's decision in National Federation of Federal
Employees, Local 1309 was correct because the language of the
statute defining the collective bargaining obligation is open to
several interpretations with respect to union-initiated midterm
bargaining. In addition, the question of whether the statute permits
midterm bergaining is best answered by the federal agency tasked
by Congress to implement the statutue, not the courts. It is clear
from a literal reading of the FSLMRS that Congress gave the FLRA
broad powers to administer the statute, and this promotes certainty
in the interpretations of the FSLMRS by decreasing the possibility
150
of future circuit court splits.
The Supreme Court correctly rejected the rationale of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, chiefly because it would be illogical to
conclude that Congress intended the midterm bargaining obligation
to be restricted to management-initiated midterm proposals only,
when one of the congressional goals in enacting the FSLMRS was
151
to increase the bargaining power of federal sector unions.
Further, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on administrative practice
under the executive order scheme that was in effect prior to the
enactment of the FSLMRS was flawed. Curiously, neither the
Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit analyzed the language of the
Department of Energy refused to negotiate the proposal. Id. The union requested to go to
impasse. Id. At impasse, the Federal Service Impasse Panel directed the Department of
Energy to adopt a modified version of the clause into the basic labor contract. Id. The
director of personnel disapproved the agreement, after which the union filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the FLRA, which held that the provision was negotiable because it was
consistent with the FSLMRS. Id. The Department of Energy petitioned for review with the
Fourth Circuit. Id.

148. Id. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(c)(2) provides in part:
The head of the agency shall approve the agreement within 30 days from the date the
agreement is executed if the agreement is in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation (unless the agency has
granted an exception to the provision).
5 U.S.C. § 7114(c)(2) (1994).
149. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v. Dep't of Interior, 119 S. Ct. 1003,
1006 (1999).
150. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
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collective bargaining duty under the executive order scheme, which
bears a striking similarity to the language used in section 158(d) of
the NLRA. This similarity would indicate that the executive order
did contemplate union-initiated midterm bargaining, especially in
light of the fact that President Nixon issued his Executive Order at
152
least fifteen years after Jacobs Manufacturing was decided.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's fear that allowing union-initiated
midterm bargaining would lead to endless negotiations seems
totally unfounded. Significantly, the court was unable to cite any
examples of this type of perpetual bargaining in the ten years since
the FLRA adopted the position that the statute requires federal
agencies to bargain midterm over union-initiated proposals under
certain circumstances.15
In contrast, the discordant view held by the District of Columbia
Circuit was also correctly rejected by the Supreme Court because
neither the FSLMRS nor its legislative history support the
conclusion that union-initiated midterm bargaining was expressly
intended by Congress. Like the Fourth Circuit, the District of
Columbia Circuit did not undertake an analysis of the language
defining the duty to bargain contained in the Executive Order
governing federal labor relations prior to enactment of the
FSLMRS. 15 Had it done so, the court would have been confronted
with the fact that Congress defined the duty to bargain in a
narrower fashion under the FSLMRS than under the Executive
Order scheme. Because the language of the Executive Order closely
mirrors the language used in the NLRA, the court would
presumably have to conclude that Congress rejected such a broad
view of collective bargaining when defining the duty to bargain
under the FSLMRS. Further, there is nothing in the legislative
history of the statute that evidences an express intent on the part
of Congress to include union-initiated midterm bargaining within
55
the definition of collective bargaining under the FSLMRS.1
The Supreme Court's holding in Local 1309 will not greatly
impact federal labor relations practice with respect to
union-initiated midterm bargaining over proposals not contained in
basic labor contracts because since IRS II, every Circuit Court of
Appeals, except the Fourth, has interpreted the. FSLMRS in the
152.
(1994).
153.
154.
155.

Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.ER. 861 (1966-70 Comp.), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101
See supra notes 119, 137 and accompanying text.
National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 810 F2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
HR. REP. No. 95-1717.
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same manner as the FLRA. 15 Undoubtedly the decision will have a
chilling effect on the willingness of federal courts to reject the
FLRAs interpretation of ambiguous sections of the FSLMRS. As a
result, federal agencies and unions will be less likely to petition the
courts for review of future FLRA decisions interpreting the
FSLMRS, resulting in a greater consistency in interpretations of the
FSLMRS.
Todd A. Portzline

156. Petitioner's brief at 26, National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1309 v.
Department of the Interior, 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999) (Nos. 97-1184, 97-1243).

